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contrasts markedly with prior conventional wisdom on the crisis. Kennedy was thought to have delivered an ultimatum to the Soviets at that time (e.g., see Abel 1966) . The incongruity between public and private versions of U.S. policy now appears striking. The U.S.-Soviet relationship dynamic was more cooperative than many had imagined (Blight and Welch 1989) .
Fortunately, in tandem with modern social science methodology, this new evidence also facilitates systematic analysis by providing a larger body of data. Our study uses evidence-derived from primary source materialsabout the Cuban crisis that has become available only in the last 5 or 6 years. Interpretive disputes and empirical disputes about historical facts are not amenable to our analysis. Our research is motivated by a fundamental interest in cognition, specifically in the integrative complexity of information processing.
For this article, we have identified a number of propositions commonly found in discussions of the crisis and cast them in terms amenable to complexity analysis. We identified three elements of the decision-making environment that have been commonly noted: the stressful nature of the enterprise of nuclear crisis decision making, the existence of ideological differences among the decision makers, and the perception that their political survival depended on bringing about a policy outcome palatable to the American public. There are probably as many ways to assess the roles of these factors in the CMC as there are CMC scholars. Because our interest is in cognition, our study focuses narrowly on the influence of stress, disagreement, and the domestic political problem on the integrative complexity of information processing. The next section reviews some of the developments in integrative complexity research that informed our application of the methodology to the CMC. In the Method section, we explain how we expect these influences to present themselves in leaders' integrative complexity scores.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION COMPLEXITY THEORY
In the analysis of information processing, one may differentiate between approaches that focus on the content and those that focus on the structure of communications (see, inter alia, Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez 1977). Structural approaches concentrate on such variables as the conceptual rules used in thinking, deciding, and interrelating (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). Integrative complexity theory, which originated in the work of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961) , is one of the best researched structural approaches (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992) . Integrative complexity scores, as hallmarks of information-processing structure, may provide a more reliable indicator of intentions and decisions (e.g., as early warnings of impending war or surprise attack) than the more easily manipulated content of communications.
The measurement of integrative complexity assesses the degree to which a person is found to differentiate (recognize different perspectives, characteristics, or dimensions of stimuli) and integrate (form connections among the differentiated perspectives, characteristics, or dimensions) in information processing. According to conceptual complexity theory (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder 1961; Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967), differentiation and integration are stable personality traits of cognitive style. Integrative complexity theory emphasizes differentiation and integration as aspects of information processing that vary not only among individuals but also from situation to situation for each individual (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992) .
Integrative complexity scores are based on analysis of the subject's verbal (written or oral) statements. Complexity is scored on a 1-7 scale. Nodal points on the scale are the scores of 1, 3, 5, and 7. At the score of 1, the subject exhibits undifferentiated thinking, with no consideration of alternative dimensions or viewpoints. The nodal point of 3 marks differentiation, in which the subject recognizes and acknowledges as legitimate more than one dimension or perspective. The nodal point of 5 is achieved when the subject integrates dimensions or perspectives into a relational system. Higher order synthesis is required for a score of 7. For example, theoretical thinking (integrations of integrations) might be found at the highest level of complexity, as compared to empirical analysis at the level of 5. Transition points are represented by scores of 2, 4, and 6 (Baker-Brown et al. 1992). The appendix provides examples of the nodal scores selected from the database used for this article.
Environmental factors play an important role in determining the level of complexity at which an individual processes information, and the individ-ual's complexity level, in turn, affects the behavioral response to particular environmental conditions. Conversely, changes in leaders' complexity will affect their decisions and thus the situation.
Among national decision makers, crisis situations (especially those in which violent conflict is present or imminent) may be expected to have the greatest impact on complexity because it is under these conditions that the stakes are highest and the risks greatest. Several studies have reported that a decrease in leaders' integrative complexity precedes the onset of violent conflict. found that leader complexity dropped between the preliminary and climactic phases of two crises culminating in war-World War I and the Korean conflict. Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez (1977) replicated this finding in the context of recurring wars in the Middle East. A complexity decrease may also precede decisions that provide uncompromising, unidimensional crisis solutions other than war (Ballard 1983 Antonovsky's (1979) sense-that is, as psychological strain that remains when the tension induced by environmental demands is not successfully overcome. It is this residue of strain-that is, that which exceeds the individual's or group's coping resources-that is manifested by the disruption of complex information processing. According to this hypothesis, problems whose implications are of extreme importance receive a major share of the decision maker's attention and psychological resources, leading to high levels of complexity; however, the decision maker's resources can eventually become depleted (e.g., if too many other demands are made on those resources, if the situation continues too long without a satisfactory solution emerging, if the potential outcomes become too threatening, or if the decision maker becomes fatigued, rushed, or distracted). At that point, the slope of the complexity curve turns downward.
It is important here to emphasize that the integrative complexity scale is a descriptive and in no sense a normative or evaluative dimension (Suedfeld 1992; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1991; ). To be sure, there will be many circumstances in the conduct of foreign policy in which the ability to process information in a complex way will confer considerable advantage on a decision maker. This happens, for example, when protagonists are engaged in the pursuit of multiple, noncongruent goals in multilateral negotiations or, more generally, in situations characterized by non-zero-sum payoff structures. The view that complex information processing is very often functional with reference to leaders' goals at the international level is bolstered by some empirical evidence: it has been shown to be associated with the peaceful resolution of international disputes ( On the other hand, high levels of complexity are neither required nor universally beneficial. According to the cognitive manager model (Suedfeld 1992) , it is preferable to gear one's efforts to perform the tasks of differentiation and integration so as to adjust to situational requirements. Complex strategies are often more costly than simpler ones in both time and effort, and may divert attention and resources from crucial to trivial information (Suedfeld and Wallbaum 1992; Tetlock and Boettger 1989). The distractions and delays of highly complex processing may lead to disaster in any situation in which time is an important factor. In other cases, for example, when the decision maker is faced with an intractable foe, complex information processing may result in concessions that the opponent can use to strengthen his or her position for the next confrontation. For example, Hitler's complexity during the Munich negotiations was considerably lower than Chamberlain's (Suedfeld 1988 (Suedfeld , 1992 ). There are several other circumstances in which high complexity may be unproductive or counterproductive (Suedfeld 1988; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1991) . In short, no particular level of complexity is good, valuable, or successful per se; its preferability is dependent on the particulars of the situation.
Although complexity is but one aspect of leadership performance, along with such characteristics as insight, intuition, decisiveness, empathy, and so forth, performance and the structure of information processing during crises are theoretically linked. This connection is perceived by scholars of historical and current events, even without an explicit recognition of the integrative complexity variable per se. In judging the performance of policymakers, a decision analyst is likely to consider factors related to the two components of complexity-differentiation and integration: evidence that the policymaker considered a number of dimensions of the problem or perspectives on it and searched for alternative solutions (i.e., differentiation), weighed the alternatives in light of their probabilities of success, and chose a course of action designed to maximize positive values and minimize losses, based on theoretical beliefs about the effects of those actions and other considerations such as morality, tradition, and values (i.e., integration). According to these criteria, a policymaker operating on the simple end of the complexity scale does not consider multiple perspectives, dimensions, or alternatives. Consequently, he or she would not meet predetermined standards of good cognitive processing, regardless of how successful a solution emerged. It may be noted that an implicit recognition of complexity-related factors has been established to exist among individuals not trained in the theory nor in the social sciences (Suedfeld et al. forthcoming).
Scholars of the CMC define the quality of decision in a variety of ways: as a function of the process that leads to the development and choice of a policy, in terms of their evaluation of the emerging policy itself, or their views about the consequences of the policy. Most frequently, CMC scholars refer to consequences-that is, the achievement of the specific policy objective of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba while averting nuclear war. This successful resolution may be one reason why the CMC has become the preeminent case study of nuclear-era crisis management.
The academic question about the CMC, explicit or implicit, has become, How did the Kennedy administration avert nuclear war (Blight 1990 
HYPOTHESES
Our research interest concerns variations in complexity on a number of dimensions. We first examined variations in individual leaders' complexity scores over time, which may be attributable to cognitive management and to disruptive stress. Second, we looked at subgroups within the leadership team, in which we sought to uncover significant differences in complexity that corresponded to the factional division of the ExComm into hawks, who called for early military action to deal with the perceived threat, and doves, who counseled patience and diplomacy. Third, we measured whether statements that individuals made for public consumption were significantly more or less complex overall than their private statements. Our examination of key U.S. policymakers draws on their written and oral statements during this period.
Hypothesis 1: Cognitive Management and Disruptive Stress
Adapting the definition proposed by Selye (1956), we can think of crisis-induced stress as psychological and physical "wear and tear" produced in the course of responding to a number of stressors characteristically present in crisis. When the physiological, social, emotional, and cognitive demands of an environment require coping responses, adaptive mechanisms come into play. Psychological models of challenging environments include some that focus on stimulus overload and exhaustion, arousal and emotional experience (attributional models), and uncertainty and unpredictability (control models). The cognitive manager model (Suedfeld 1992) portrays cognitive reaction to such stressors as analogous to the general adaptation syndrome (Selye 1956 ). The mobilization of cognitive resources in response to the recognition of a crisis is analogous to the alarm reaction. In the second stage, resistance, an ongoing level of relatively high complexity (depending on the perceived importance of the problem compared to other, concurrent demands), prevails.
If, finally, the exhaustion stage is reached, it is mirrored in a growing incapacity for highly complex information processing. Thus we would expect high complexity as the ExComm groped its way toward a final decision. However, as the process continued, disruptive stress because of fatigue and information overload could lead to a leveling off or even a reversal of this trend in the later stages of the crisis.
The issue of whether disruptive stress could be predicted in the CMC is complicated by the absence of any direct psychological or physiological measures of stress. However, there is consensus that during international crises, decision makers' performance may be adversely affected as powerful stresses are generated by multiple interactions among the following elements: threats to vital national interest, the enormous risks of war in the nuclear age, the fatigue of lengthy deliberations, uncertainty about the opponent's intentions, an increase in the volume and confusion of intelligence data, growing difficulties in maintaining tactical control as forces move to higher states of alert, the intense time pressures of crisis, and the complex synergy that rapidly develops between the demands of crisis management and the pressures of domestic politics (Bracken 1983 It thus seems appropriate to assume that the ongoing crisis posed a cumulative challenge and depleted the coping resources of the ExComm members over time. Whether it depleted those resources to the point of reaching the stage of exhaustion (and complexity decrease) is the empirical question addressed in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: Differences within the Leadership Group
Conventional wisdom on the CMC has it that the ExComm was divided between hawks and doves on such important questions as the significance of the missiles in Cuba and the appropriate U.S. response to the Soviet move. The decision to blockade the island of Cuba (officially described as a quarantine, because under international law, a blockade is an act of war) has been presented in Allison's (1971) classic account as the result of debate between hawks, who wanted rapid military action, and doves, who preferred a greater reliance on diplomacy. Lebow (1990) emphasized the seriousness of the division when he argued that the need to maintain consensus in the ExComm was perceived by the president as a greater pressure than any external strategic considerations.
The case can be made that because doves hesitated to use force and because their policy advocacy statements would then have to reconcile the need to maintain resolve with their desire for nonmilitary solutions, their side would have to generate comparatively complex solutions. Hawks, on the other hand, could concentrate on the single goal of removing the missiles, even if this required armed conflict.
There are two lines of previous research on which to base hypotheses concerning complexity differences within the leadership group. One is the generally higher complexity preceding negotiated rather than bellicose solutions Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez 1977) . This may imply that leaders who advocate negotiated outcomes may themselves think more complexly about the issue than those supporting armed confrontation. The one study that analyzed individual differences in this regard (Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk 1993) supported that hypothesis.
The second basis is the work of Tetlock (1983a Tetlock ( , 1984 Tetlock ( , 1986 ) on value pluralism. His studies showed that individuals who experience value conflictthat is, a need to reconcile two important goals that seem to be mutually incompatible-deal with the situation in a more complex way than those who focus mostly on one value or goal and who have no difficulty in abandoning the alternative.
In the case of the ExComm, the relevant demarcation is between hawks and doves. If the inference from the Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk (1993) study is applied, we would predict that doves will show higher integrative complexity than hawks. On the other hand, the value conflict hypothesis does not predict such a sharp difference. Both groups would be striving for the same set of shared goals: the removal of the Soviet missiles without starting a war between the superpowers, the retention of public support within the United States, and minimal cost to the Kennedy administration. There is no reason to expect that either hawks or doves would experience more conflict among these considerations, and, therefore, move toward higher levels of complexity, than their counterparts: the disagreement would center on the means (the appropriate use of military force) by which these consensual goals could best be attained. Note that we are not positing links between complexity and dispositional or personality traits such as aggressiveness, nor are we suggesting that such traits underlay the hawk-dove dimension.
Hypothesis 3: Public and Private Communications
The existing literature takes differing views on whether the audience being addressed has an important impact on the complexity of communications. Some studies have found no significant differences between private letters or diaries on one hand and books, articles, and speeches on the other ( were obtained from the president's office files and National Security files of the archives of the John F. Kennedy Library.
We sought to gather a large number of utterances for as many members of the ExComm as possible, from time frames both well before and after the alleged resolution of the crisis. When possible, we used writings and transcribed oral utterances that were directed specifically to the crisis or, when this was not possible, those that touched on some aspect of relevance to the crisis (e.g., relations with the Soviet Union, defense policy, or Latin American affairs). The scoring unit is usually defined as a paragraph, although short paragraphs may be combined and longer paragraphs that skip from theme to theme may be broken up. The essential factor in identifying the utterance unit is the completion of the speaker's train of thought (topic sentence). Sampling and blind scoring were performed according to the standard guidelines for complexity researchers (Baker-Brown et al. 1992). Interjudge correlations were at or above the acceptable level of r = .85.
In the case of political speeches, an interesting issue arises when a complexity score may be attributed to a speaker who did not write his own statement. Very high correlations are typically found between the complexity level of material known to have been personally written by the leader and that of material written by an aide but disseminated in the name of the leader. To begin with, leaders are likely to select ghostwriters whose thinking processes conform to those of the employer. Further, particularly in the case of important communications, leaders read the statement beforehand and make any adjustments deemed necessary. Public transmission constitutes an endorsement that is not made if there is a clash between how the message is phrased and the signer's level of information processing (e.g., Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977). The CMC study offers further research insights into this issue because we were able to obtain various drafts of some speeches.
DISAGGREGATIONS OF THE DATA SET
We divided our data set into three time periods, one of which we further subdivided, for a total of four time periods (Table 1) . Based on the consensus in the literature, we consider the crisis as beginning on October 16, 1962, the day the president received conclusive evidence of Soviet IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba. We, therefore, coded as precrisis those statements made between January and October 15, 1962. Postcrisis statements are those made after October 29, 1962 (the day after the U.S.S.R. announced that it would withdraw all of its missiles from Cuba, effectively ending the military Lastly, to examine the effects of intended audience on complexity, we generated separate comparisons for public and private statements. Included in private utterances were internal Kennedy administration memos and letters, as well as the ExComm transcripts. The public sample included speeches and press conferences.
It should be noted that because of differing availability of materials across various categories, the number of scored paragraphs differs from comparison to comparison. All statistical analyses, therefore, were performed of necessity on unequal sample sizes. To ensure that our results were not biased by this, we used an N-way ANOVA design, with actor identity as a variable, and checked for interaction effects. In the event, uneven sample sizes did not produce a significant effect on the results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION HYPOTHESIS 1: COGNITIVE MANAGEMENT AND DISRUPTIVE STRESS
When we look at the ExComm team collectively and examine the crisis period as a whole, there is little evidence of disruptive stress in ExComm members' complexity scores (Table 2 ). There was no significant change in the mean complexity of the U.S. leaders from the precrisis to the crisis phase, F(2, 8) = 2.06, ns. These findings are compatible with those reported by . Of course, temporal aggregations of a week or more do not allow us to isolate the impact of even the most vital transient events, such as the downing of an American U-2 aircraft by a Soviet surface-to-air missile fired from Cuba on October 27 (Blight and Welch 1989). Table 2 , therefore, also shows the more precise picture that is obtained when we divide the data for the 13-day crisis period into the two subperiods representing the early (closed) and late (open) stages, as described previously. The mean complexity score was higher in the early, secret deliberation phase of the crisis than in the precrisis phase (prior to the October 16 discovery of missile sites in Cuba). Complexity scores dropped again in the late-crisis period, after Kennedy's October 22 public statement. They rose once more after the crisis was considered over on October 28. When the data are grouped in this way, we observe a more complex, statistically significant pattern of change, F(3, 12) = 3.89, p < .05.
Post hoc pairwise comparisons of the time periods showed the pattern predicted by the combined cognitive-manager/disruptive-stress models: an increase in complexity as the challenge was recognized and coping mechanisms were activated, with the allocation of significant resources to dealing with the problem (precrisis to early crisis, the alarm and resistance stages), and a decrease as the situation continued without resolution and with the elimination of some options (early to late crisis periods, the exhaustion stage). Although the curve shows recovery to higher levels once a solution had been found and implemented (late crisis to postcrisis), this difference did not reach statistical significance.
When we disaggregate the data by taking sample means for individual actors, the same inverted-U pattern generally prevails. Attorney General Robert F Kennedy was an exception: he followed an idiosyncratic pattern, showing higher average complexity in the late-crisis phase after the October 22 announcement and a sharp postcrisis drop (see Table 3 ). Our comparison of the complexity of the so-called hawks and doves showed no significant differences. This could be explained for public statements, for which ExComm members might have felt the need to take a united stance for both domestic and Soviet consumption; but in fact, complexity differences among hawks and doves were also surprisingly small in private communications.
One explanation is that the hawk position was not, in fact, as uncomplicated as it appears to be when portrayed by the doves. Any form of military action against Cuba itself, and, almost inevitably, against the numerous and capable Soviet forces stationed there, would itself involve weighing many complex alternative plans, as the transcripts of the ExComm debates make clear.
Another category of explanations may be that the division of the Kennedy team into hawks and doves is too simplistic, the assignment of individuals to these categories is inaccurate, and/or any ideological differences between the groups were actually too insignificant to show up in our analysis. For example, Kennedy has been depicted in crisis narratives as playing the role of moral conscience in the ExComm because of his argument that an early air strike would be a "Pearl Harbor in reverse" (quoted in Sorensen 1965, 684). However, Kennedy also said the following on October 16:
We should also think of ... whether there is some other way we can get involved in this through, uh, Guantanamo Bay, or something, er, or whether there's some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something." (Kennedy presidential recordings 1962a, 27) Finally, a comparison of the integrative complexity of hawks and doves could be simply misdirected, missing the point. There are two possibilities. Following Lebow's (1990) analysis, the significance of the debate (regardless of whether one side is more complex than the other) rests with its effect: President Kennedy's perception that he needed to create a consensus. Looking at it this way, Kennedy's high complexity, and the similarity of the complexity scores of hawks and doves, may be partially accounted for by the president's focus on consensus, which led him to acknowledge the various perspectives of his team members and to integrate them in his own statements, while simultaneously playing down disputes.
As a last-and our preferred-alternative explanation, we propose that the hawk-versus-dove distinction is a matter of the content of communications and beliefs and, therefore, is not reflected in the structural index used here. This explanation is compatible with the theoretical status of integrative complexity as independent of political viewpoint or specific decisions being considered (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992).
HYPOTHESIS 3: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
As Table 4 indicates, private utterances showed significantly higher complexity for most ExComm members studied. This pattern suggests a greater willingness to explore, qualify, and put forward alternatives when one is not in the glare of the public eye.
The finding of significant differences between public and private complexity involves a confound in the relatively high average complexity during the early-crisis phase (see Table 2 ). In this narrow time frame, October 16-22, the Kennedy administration met secretly on the subject of Cuba. Few public statements were made during this time, particularly by those whose roles normally involved fewer occasions for speaking in public. Separating the audience effect from other factors is thus complicated by the uneven distribution of public and private statements among the various time periods. We had to consider that if there is indeed an audience effect, our use of predominantly private statements in the early-crisis data set might be the reason for our finding of high average complexity in that phase. To compare the early-and late-crisis phases, we isolated the sample of private utterances, which, thanks primarily to declassification of the ExComm transcripts, is large enough for comparison. Aside from a few memos between administration officials, private complexity during the early-and late-crisis periods is largely a comparison of two transcribed ExComm meetings. Comparisons on those two dates show the ExComm members' complexity in the same forum but at different times: meeting secretly before going public versus meeting in the eleventh hour of a very public crisis. Table 5 shows mean complexity scores in one specific forum, ExComm deliberations, on two specific days, October 16 (from the early-crisis phase) and October 27 (from the late-crisis phase). In the ExComm meeting on October 16, the administration faced a novel situation and charted a tentative course. The discussions on that day included a debate about the range of action required in response to the Soviet move. The ExComm's effort to grasp the dimensions of the problem and its debate over a range of possible responses were reflected in relatively high complexity scores.
All ExComm members studied, except Robert F. Kennedy, were less complex on October 27. Stressors in the immediate environment that could account for the complexity drop shown by four of the five members are easy to identify. By October 27, the administration had pursued its course of action for a number of days and had notified the nation and the world that the United States was resolved to compel the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from (Blight and Welch 1989) . One possibility is that the relatively high complexity scores of both Kennedy brothers on October 27 reflect their privileged knowledge that the resolution of the crisis was already at hand.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Several directions for further research emerge from our study. First, the cognitive-manager/disruptive-stress model is supported by our finding that the complexity of the Kennedy team actually went up in the early-crisis period but that, perhaps because of a combination of fatigue and the eleventhhour atmosphere of the October 27 meeting, complexity dropped in the late-crisis period (see Table 2 ). When we looked specifically at five administration leaders, we found that the Kennedy brothers evidenced a complexity level relatively higher than that of McNamara, Bundy, or Rusk. Do the anomalous results for the Kennedys themselves derive from their knowledge of a secret agreement with Soviet leaders concerning the resolution of the crisis? We cannot say definitively from these data, but the idea that disruptive stress decreases with the psychological rather than the historical or "actual" resolution of the crisis has been advanced before (Ballard 1983; Suedfeld, Corteen, and McCormick 1986 ).
If such a phenomenon exists, accommodating it would complicate archival research. Complexity analysts would need to read not only the historical record but also the materials revealing the decision makers' state of mind and their own demarcations of the temporal periods of crisis and its resolution. Using personal diaries or (with great caution!) ex post facto interviews might shed some light on this.
The very fact of a secret agreement is a humbling reminder to decision analysts as to the limitations of evidence and hence our ability to make inferences about decision processes. Also, the temporal demarcations of crisis, postcrisis, and so on are in themselves significant, and in future work, we intend to expand our study ti include the longer period following the crisis, during which the United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed to establish a hot line and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
Next, there is the negative finding that the supposed hawks and doves within the decision-making group were not significantly different in complexity of information processing. The situation for U.S. military planners may have been more complex than previously supposed. Soviet sources at the Havana meetings, part of a series of five meetings titled "The Causes and Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," which began in 1987, have said that there were 43,000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba, rather than the 10,000 thought to have been there, and that, in addition to 20 nuclear warheads intended for use on medium-range missiles, there were nine tactical nuclear weapons for use against apotential American invasion force (see Lukas 1992; Tolchin 1992). There has been a recent debate about whether U.S. military planning was geared for invasion of Cuba and whether, with the settlement of the CMC, U.S. policymakers conclusively abandoned the possibility of such an invasion (Nathan 1992; Pear 1992; Garthoff 1987) .
In future work, we shall examine the ExComm and analogous material more finely to determine how group processes influence complexity, once enough additional ExComm data has been declassified to allow the recovery of something approximating a true time series. Of particular interest is whether the interaction among group members produces sequential complexity effects. For example, in dialogue, is an integratively complex statement likely to be met with a similarly complex response? Or would the next speaker be more likely to simplify, to contradict the first more forcefully, or to support the first and channel the discussion toward conclusion? Does it matter who the speakers are? There is no doubt that further research into the link between integrative complexity and leadership roles is warranted.
The issue of impression management requires further exploration. Previous evidence on whether self-presentation motives affect complexity has been mixed (Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992). Here, we have been able to compare public and secret utterances during a major international crisis involving threat of nuclear war. We discovered critical differences in the complexity of public and private statements. Nevertheless, the mechanism underlying the public-private difference is not established. Other explanations are feasible, but we cannot rule out the possibility that thematic structure can be affected by external, including political, motives, similarly to the content of utterances.
Conventional wisdom on the CMC emphasizes the administration's crisis management skills and internal divisions, and the pressure on the ExComm to satisfy the American public. Given that this event has come to be considered the prototypic cold war nuclear crisis, debate about its meaning and lessons is perhaps inevitable (see Blight and Welch 1989; Bobrow 1989; Lukas 1987 ). Present-day hawks and doves continue to disagree on issues that were contentious in the 1962 crisis, particularly the nature of Soviet intentions and the proper role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. The meaning and lessons of the CMC, in turn, are seen by each camp to support contemporary policy positions (Guttieri 1990; Lukas 1987 ). On the whole, the hawks view the crisis as a missed opportunity by the American administration to take action against the communist regime in Cuba (Cline 1989 ). On the other hand, the doves generally view the crisis as a dangerous confrontation caused in large measure by a misunderstanding of Soviet motives and intentions (Lebow 1981) .
The measurement of the integrative complexity of leaders' information processing promises to provide valuable substantive insights not only into these issues and crisis behavior per se but also into leaders' simultaneous interactions with their colleagues, opponents, and the broader context within which they operate.
APPENDIX Sample Utterances and Complexity Scores
Score of 1: Single, undifferentiated perspective You know, it seems to me we're missing a bet here. I think that we ought to take this case to-send directly to Khrushchev by fast wire the most violent protest, and demand that he-that he stop this business and stop it right away, or we're going to take those SAM-sites out immediately. There is another lesson that every veteran has learned. Wars solve no problems by themselves. They only give us another chance to work on the problems that lead to wars. In fact, the problems of war and the problems of peace cannot be separated from each other. Individual freedom is both a condition and an objective of a peaceful world, and inequality of opportunity is as much a source of international difficulties as it is an obstacle to domestic tranquillity. We need better schools not only to train scientists and engineers for national defense, but also to produce experts who can find economical ways to turn salt water into fresh. And we need time to educate humanists who can teach us how to use less of our working time destroying each other and less of our leisure time destroying ourselves. These problems are the greatest challenge that this occasion puts before us. It must not be said that those whose sacrifice we celebrate fought and died in vain. We honor our veterans better by silence than by speech, so that we can remember what they meant to us and what they did for us. And we honor them better with actions than with words, using the freedom for which they fought to build the future in which they believed. 
